Moral foundations theory describes how humans evolved to possess innate moral impulses. These impulses drive us to value:
- fairness
- purity
- in-group loyalty
- liberty
- caring for others
- respect for authority
These six moral foundations are found across all human cultures, however, they are expressed and understood in various ways depending on the particular culture or subculture in question.
Moral impulses were selected for in our evolutionary history due to the fact that they are essential to a social species, and because they tend to enhance group fitness. In a society these moral impulses are codified into laws and moral norms —what we generally refer to as morality.
Morality, however, is often a double-edged sword.
While moral impulses and moral norms tend to enhance group fitness, some moral systems may harm group fitness. And unrestrained morality, in any society, has the potential to be a serious threat to the well-being and liberty of the individual.
Those who run afoul of popular morality have been treated with extreme cruelty throughout human history — either by a retributive (rather than remedial) legal system or through vigilante acts. Morality has also been used to drum up support for various forms of violent aggression (e.g., pogroms, terrorism, wars of aggression, etc.), and it has been weaponized in order to persecute those who have simply been accused of wrongdoing.
In recent times we see this type of abuse associated with “cancel culture”, however, this phenomenon is nothing new (for historical example see: McCarthyism, witch hunts, the Inquisition).
A modern philosophically and scientifically informed view of morality demonstrates the complexity of moral questions, and it confirms descriptive moral relativism — that is, it shows that what is considered morally good (or bad) in regards to particular issues changes over time and varies from culture to culture. This fact provides prima facie grounds for being skeptical about moral realism, and at the very least it should make us question the epistemological status of generally accepted morality.
A philosophically informed view also provides prima facie reasons (at the least) to be skeptical about free will. If humans do indeed lack metaphysical freedom of will, then no one can be said to be deserving of punishment. Even if we assume some degree of free will, there are many reasons to oppose cruel punishments, and any sort of aggressive violence in general. Additionally, ignorance and neuro- or psychopathology are much more parsimonious explanations of antisocial behavior than metaphysical evil (all of which are possibly remediable).
In consideration of this view, one may be tempted to give up on the project of morality entirely (that is, to accept a passive form of moral nihilism), but this would be a mistake. Morality is necessary for the practical functioning of human society.
What is needed is a system of morality that is grounded in compassionate understanding, and which is appropriately restrained by philosophical reason.
Plato, and Freud — who borrowed from Plato in his work — wrote about why morality must be restrained or guided by reason. Both Plato and Freud viewed the human psyche as being divided into three parts: a rational part, a primitive desire-driven part, and a moral part. Plato uses the analogy of a charioteer (reason) who has to restrain and coordinate the actions of a white horse (morality) and a black horse (primitive desire). Freud describes a tripartite psyche divided into the ego (the organism’s conception of self — which uses reason to understand the world), a superego (morality), and an id (primitive desire). These conceptions are helpful when we think about the influence of morality on the individual, and on society.
Both of these thinkers emphasized the importance of reason as a moderating force to restrain or guide these two instinctual drives. If either of these instinctual drives is given too much freedom the individual will be in peril (as will be those they interact with).
Reason, for example, informs us that retribution and cruel punishment are not actions that have clear justifications (see my point about free will above). Rational analysis also shows us that we should withhold assent to some moral impulses — such as those to purity — since they are outmoded in light of a modern understanding (such as a modern understanding of disease causation).
If one’s moral impulses are not restrained by reason, they may become an inspiration for cruelty in the form of retribution, hate, and aggressive violence. History is rife with examples of aggrieved groups standing up to injustice, only to end up matching or overshadowing the injustice of those they opposed. We see this today in some of the most zealous segments of the cultural Right and Left.
Generally speaking, certain segments of the cultural Left want to enact violence on those who do not share their conceptions of the moral foundations — their egalitarian view of care and fairness, and their emphasis on positive conceptions of liberty; whereas those in certain segments of the radical Right want to enact violence on those who do not share their in-group loyalty / care, their meritocratic conception of fairness, and their emphasis on negative liberty.
If one’s moral code can be used to justify a non-defensive infliction of harm, then it is not sufficiently restrained by reason. And without reason we have no hope of arriving at significant intersubjectivity about moral questions — we will only have competing systems of morality based on epistemically suspect cultural conventions like dogmatic religion or folk wisdom.
If we do not challenge priggishness on the individual level we risk developing a judgmental attitude that results in conflict and possible social alienation; similarly, internally focused judgment can harm us by engendering unproductive guilt and shame. On the societal level we risk the possibility of letting anger and vindictiveness grow until violent conflict is unavoidable. Only critical thought and reason can prevent these damaging consequences.