Nearly every philosophical question hinges on ultimate metaphysical questions — such as, “Why does something exist, instead of nothing?” Or, “Is the universe intelligently designed?” How one answers these questions will determine, to a great extent, their views on other metaphysical questions, on epistemology, and on ethics.
Many people throughout history have answered these ultimate questions through various conceptions of theism — that is, various conceptions of an entity or entities possessing higher order intelligence and other extraordinary powers. The most common term used to describe such entities is “god” or “deity”.
When it comes to the origin of theism, or religion / spirituality in general, we do not have a lot of definitive answers. The precise time period and the exact nature of the first religion / spirituality is obscured by the fog of time, however, anthropological evidence suggests that some of the earliest forms of religion or spirituality may have involved sun / lunar worship, ancestor worship, and animal / nature worship. Some of these proto-religions evolved over time to become more organized and explicitly theistic.
Over the millennia, theism and religion have evolved through a selection process similar to that which biological organisms are subjected to. Tens of thousands of gods and religions are dead — no one, or nearly no one, believes in them. The religious belief systems which have outcompeted rival systems usually involve classical theism, a moralistic deity or deities, an afterlife involving rewards and punishments, and duties to proselytize.
Despite the fact that the world’s most successful religions (Islam and Christianity), and increased knowledge of the natural world, have virtually relegated some forms of theism — such as solar / lunar worship — to anthropological history, there are still several other active forms of theism (e.g., deism, polytheism, pantheism, pandeism, etc.).
With so many forms of theism, it does not seem tenable for one to hold just one position. Therefore, the position that I take with regard to theism depends on the form of theism in question.
With regard to the traditional form of theism posited by the world’s most successful religions — Christianity and Islam — I am a strong atheist, and, in a sense, an antitheist.
I take the position of strong atheism because, as I argue in this article, in some instances absence of evidence is evidence of absence. In other words, I object to traditional Christian or Islamic theism on evidentialist grounds. Further, the dominant form of these religions entails classical theism and classical theism entails untenable logical contradictions. I outline some of these in my article on the Epicurean paradox. (Note: There are many other strong arguments that can be leveled against this form of theism, but I consider the arguments stated here to be the primary reasons why I reject this view.)
I take the position of antitheism toward the traditional form of Christian / Islamic theism because I believe it may be harmful on an individual level (depending on the specifics of the belief system), and on a wider, societal level (e.g., stifling scientific progress, inspiring bigotry against sexual minorities, providing rationalizations for systemic animal abuse, etc.). Moreover, the clash of major religions — in the modern age — is a strong contributor to the existential threat posed by global conflict involving weapons of mass destruction. (Note: This doesn’t mean I directly try to get individuals to change their religious beliefs — there are a number of reasons why this is unlikely, and, further, why it may not be helpful. In fact, in some instances, it could be harmful. My take on antitheism is resistance to these belief systems in general — that is, arguing against these belief systems, rather than directing critical arguments toward any specific individual without that person desiring a philosophical discussion on this subject.)
Polytheistic conceptions of gods vary from tradition to tradition and individual to individual. The ancient philosopher Epicurus, for instance, may have believed in the gods of the ancient Greek pantheon, but, as Tom Robinson argues, it seems that he may have conceived of them in a metaphorical or quasi-metaphorical sense — that is, as something similar to Platonic or Jungian archetypes. Also, polytheism does not usually entail the four attributes of classical theism, so the logical contradictions discussed above do not necessarily apply. Depending on the conception of polytheism in question, I would take the position of weak atheism, theological non-cognitivism, or strong atheism.
Stated briefly, I would take the position of theological non-cognitivism if the conceptions posited are unfalsifiable, since if it is not possible to falsify a hypothesis, neither is it possible to prove it; further, if we cannot falsify a hypothesis, then we are discussing a logical absurdity with no actual meaning. Weak atheism stops short of stating that these conceptions of god are existentially impossible, but objects to them on evidentialist grounds (we do not have good epistemological reasons to believe in them). If the form of polytheism in question made falsifiable claims about their conception of gods, then, barring some sufficient evidence, I would take the position of strong atheism.
Regarding more vague conceptions of god — such as those entailed by deism, pantheism, pandeism, or ill-defined “spiritual” conceptions — I am either a theological non-cognitivist or a weak atheist (for the same reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph), depending on the particulars of the conception. Theological non-cognitivism, on my view, would apply to any sort of theism which does not provide a meaningful (clear / intelligible / coherent) or falsifiable definition of god/s.
